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1. Philosophy, Ethics, and I 
 
In this essay I will illustrate how a Japanese philosopher reacted to a newly 
imported discipline, “bioethics,” in the 1980s and then tried to create an 
alternative way of looking at “life” in the field of philosophy. This essay 
might serve as an interesting case study in which a contemporary “western” 
way of thinking succeeded in capturing, but finally failed to persuade, a 
then-young Japanese researcher’s mind. 
 
I awoke to philosophy when I was first seized by the fear of death at the 
age of around ten to twelve. One night I came up with the idea that the 
whole [27/28] universe might disappear when I die. My world filled with 
the sense of security collapsed inside me. I was thrown into an 
unimaginable world of solitude and loneliness, and I became a philosopher 
in the strict sense of the word. Although I had never read philosophical 
books, nor had I even known the word philosophy until then, I became a 
person who could not live without thinking about the fundamental 
mysteries and secrets of the world I was living in. In my younger days, the 
central topics of my philosophical investigation were focused on issues in 
the actual world surrounding me. I was an “applied philosopher” from the 
moment I first became a philosopher. 
 
I began a course of natural sciences at the University of Tokyo, hoping to 
study quantum physics, but soon I turned to philosophy, and started 
learning western thought and Japanese philosophy in the Rinrigaku 
Kenkyushitsu (Ethics Section) of the Literature Department. However, I 
was greatly disappointed with the method of research in that section, 
because that section was dominated by the iron law that “ethics is nothing 
but philology.” The same was true of the philosophy section. I was hoping 
to explore such philosophical questions as “What is life?”, “What is 
death?”, and “What is existence?” with my own thoughts and in my own 
words, but my dreams were brutally destroyed. They tried to brainwash me, 
saying that philosophy was nothing but the study of Kant, Hegel, or other 
great philosophers of the past. Of course I do not object if a person who 
loves Kant becomes a specialist in Kant. It is no doubt a great 
accomplishment. What I could not accept was the idea that philosophy was 
nothing but the study of past great philosophers. Anyway, this was the 
atmosphere hanging over academic philosophical studies in 1980s Japan. In 
graduate school I studied analytic philosophy, particularly Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of mind, on the surface, but under the surface I began studying 
bioethics, which was just beginning to emerge as a new discipline imported 
from the US, UK, and Australia.  
 
2. Introduction of bioethics into Japan 
 
I participated in a translation group managed by Nobuyuki Iida and 
Hisatake Kato at Chiba University, and translated some important papers in 
bioethics from English into Japanese. In addition to that, I frequently 
visited the office of Keiko Nakamura and Shohei Yonemoto at Mitsubishi 
Kasei Institute of Life Science to study bioethics from the perspective of 
biology and the history of science. In the 1980s, there were at least four 
research groups on bioethics as far as I know: Chiba University’s group, 
Mitsubishi Kasei’s group, Waseda University’s group, and Sophia 
University’s group. [28/29]  
 
Chiba University’s group was made up of graduate students and 
postdoctoral researchers whose main research themes were traditional 
European philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. Professors Iida 
and Kato assigned them papers on bioethics and had them translate those 
papers into Japanese, although most of them did not wish to be bioethicists. 
I was an exception in that group because I had already read many major 
articles in bioethics before meeting those professors. A collection of 
translations was published by Tokai University Press in 1988 which 
became the first translated anthology on bioethics. 
 
The interpretation of bioethics in Mitsubishi Kasei’s group was different. 
Keiko Nakamura was a molecular biologist and Shohei Yonemoto was a 
science historian. They were trying to explore the possibility of introducing 
the knowledge of molecular biology and advanced natural sciences into our 
society in a harmonious and sound way. Their idea was that we could learn 
a number of important lessons from history: both the history of our 
relationship with scientific technology and the evolutionary history of the 
genes of creatures. They did not identify bioethics with “medical ethics.” 
Their understanding of bioethics was similar to that of Van Rensselaer 
Potter’s Bioethics, which was first published in 1971 in order to raise an 
alarm over a global environmental crisis. Later, Jiro Nudeshima, a 
then-young sociologist, joined the members of the institute. The 
perspective of the group was enlarged to include sociology and cultural 
anthropology.  
 
Another prominent figure in Japanese bioethics was Rihito Kimura at 
Waseda University. Before coming back to Waseda, he had taught at the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, one of the earliest 
bioethics research centers in the US. He wished to establish in his native 
country his own bioethics that had been formed through exchanges with his 
colleagues at Georgetown in the 1980s. His vigorous activities inside and 
outside the Japanese academy influenced many people. At that time he was 
considered by many to be a spokesperson for American-style bioethics. 
 
In this period, Sophia University, a Jesuit university located in Tokyo, had a 
unique research program on bioethics and medical ethics. They had a 
special room in their library for bioethics literature written in foreign 
languages. I sometimes visited there and read papers and books in English. 
Among the faculty there was Juan Masiá, who came from Spain to teach 
theology and medical ethics. For us his lectures and articles were valuable 
sources of European-style bioethics based on Christianity. 
 
In addition to the scholars mentioned above, there were other people who 
were closely involved in the early stages of development of bioethics in 
Japan, such as Taro Takemi, who, influenced by Potter’s bioethics, 
established an institute aiming at human survival in the age of global 
environmental crisis; [29/30] Akihiko Okamura, who promoted bioethics 
with Rihito Kimura; Koichi Bai, who was a specialist in medical law; and 
Yonezo Nakagawa, who helped found medical anthropology in Japan. 
However, it is my impressionthat outside of them, very few scholars were 
devoting themselves to bioethics in the first half of the 1980s. The 
importation process of bioethics was sporadic and chaotic.  
 
Bioethics was not acknowledged as an academic discipline in universities. 
My fellow students, even professors, looked at me as if I were a bizarre 
creature. I will never forget a student’s words: “Studying bioethics will lead 
you to excommunication.” Another student kindly recommended that I 
should be a journalist rather than a philosopher. The philological tradition 
in Japanese academic philosophy really suffocated me. 
 
In contrast, studying bioethics liberated my mind. In the field of bioethics I 
was able to think freely about the issues of life and death from a 
philosophical point of view. It was an exciting experience to think about 
actual ethical issues arising from advanced medicine and biological 
sciences. I thought I had finally found a discipline to which I could devote 
all my energy. To my eyes, bioethics was a place where I could think about 
actual philosophical and ethical issues with my own thoughts and in my 
own words.  
 
Potter’s bioethics also captured my mind. I studied environmental ethics, 
ecological ethics, human ecology, and other related areas to integrate them 
with medical bioethics. And this idea led me later to propose a field of 
study, “life studies,” in which both medical ethics and environmental ethics 
are to be simultaneously discussed. At that time I did not feel any 
ambivalence toward bioethics. 
 
3. Brain Death and Organ Transplantation 
 
The situation surrounding bioethics dramatically changed when the issue of 
brain death and organ transplantation reemerged in the mid-1980s. Looking 
back in history, Japan’s first heart transplant from a “brain-dead” donor was 
performed in 1968. The surgery was successful; however, the judgment of 
brain death of the donor patient was not clear, and the doctor in charge of 
the donor patient was accused of homicide by activists. After that, heart 
transplantation became a taboo topic for about fifteen years. Then, in the 
mid-1980s, the issue of brain death and organ transplantation was again 
posed by the medical profession, aiming at establishing a brain death law 
and resuming heart transplantation from brain-dead donors. Transplantation 
doctors began a vigorous public information campaign on brain death. 
Many journalists reacted to this movement sensitively. Takashi Tachibana, 
a well-known best-selling [30/31] author, was among those who doubted 
doctors’ argument on brain death. He read monographs on brain surgery, 
interviewed medical specialists, and gradually began realizing that brain 
death criteria were not scientifically sound ones. He published the book 
Brain Death in 1986 and harshly criticized the Japanese criteria for brain 
death. His book became a best seller, which deeply influenced a number of 
people concerned with this issue. 
 
Although I was a graduate student at that time, I recklessly plunged into the 
debate on brain death, not only because the issue of brain death was a 
philosophical problem occurring in actual society, but also because it was 
closely connected to the problem of death which had continuously 
occupied my mind since my younger days. Doctors who wished to promote 
organ transplantation claimedthat the death of the brain is the death of the 
human person in terms of natural science, but philosophically speaking, 
natural science cannot determine what human death is because it is a 
philosophical and religious question rather than a scientific one. It was 
urgently necessary that philosophers who specialized in logical analysis be 
involved in the controversy. I participated in the discussion not only from 
my own inner interests, but also motivated by the conviction that 
philosophers should play a more positive role in actual social issues. 
 
I thought that the essence of the issue of brain death consists in the human 
relationships surrounding a brain-dead patient. Almost all arguments on 
brain death, including that of Tachibana, made the assumption that the 
essence of the issue exists inside the brain of a brain-dead patient. On the 
contrary, I argued that we can truly understand it only when we look at 
human relationships formed between a brain-dead patient and his/her 
family members at the bedside. I claimed that a brain-dead patient is, dead 
or alive, a human person, and hence that there exist true human 
relationships between a brain-dead patient and his/her family members. I 
called that patient a “brain-dead person.” Thinking like this, we can for the 
first time understand the state of mind of parents who speak to their 
brain-dead child again and again while fully understanding the medical 
condition of their child’s brain. I published the book Brain-Dead Person in 
1989 and proposed the concept of “brain death as a form of human 
relationships.”  
 
“Brain death” is not to be found inside the brain of the person whose 
brain has ceased to function, but in the sphere of human relationships 
surrounding that person. What we should be considering is “brain 
death as a sphere.” The essence of brain death is to be found in 
relationships between people.(1) 
 
It is also worth mentioning that in this book I applied the concepts of 
“death of the first person,” “death of the second person,” and “death of the 
third person,” [31/32] which were first discussed by Vladimir Jankélévitch 
in his book La Mort,(2) to the case of brain death. By distinguishing these 
three concepts, I tried to argue that the question “Is brain death human 
death?” is not a philosophically sound one because this question should be 
asked separately in at least three ways that correspond to the three concepts 
mentioned above. In other chapters, I discussed brain death from the 
perspective of philosophy of science and civilization studies. This was 
probably the first Japanese book that dealt with this social issue from a 
consistent philosophical perspective from its first page to the last. 
 
I have published a number of papers and essays elsewhere about the 
controversy over brain death and transplantation in Japan; nevertheless, I 
would like to note here a couple of very important aspects of those issues. 
Japan’s first organ transplantation law was established in 1997, and the 
second heart transplant from a brain-dead donor was performed in 1999. 
This means that there was no heart transplantation for more than 30 years 
in this country. We had a long discussion on brain death during this period, 
especially from the mid-1980s to 1997. This was a real nationwide debate. 
Every major newspaper and TV program reported on this topic extensively. 
They conducted national opinion surveys many times. More than 100 
books on brain death were published, most of which were books for 
ordinary citizens. Japan was probably the country where the issue of brain 
death was discussed most heatedly in the world. According to opinion 
surveys, about 50 percent thought brain death is human death, 30 percent 
thought brain death is not human death, and 20 percent was not able to 
determine. One of the interesting things is that many journalists, scholars, 
and activists expressed their doubts on brain death, and published a number 
of articles and books that attempted to criticize the concept of brain death 
and its application to actual medical procedures. 
 
It is worth noticing that some of those writers paid special attention to the 
emotional and spiritual aspect of the family members of brain-dead patients, 
and wrote influential articles and books. They thought that family members 
who regarded their brain-dead patients as living persons did not 
misunderstand the concept, but rather that in their perception of brain-dead 
patients lay an invaluable source of insight we should inquire into. Michi 
Nakajima called it “invisible death,” Kunio Yanagida called it “death of the 
second person,” Yoshihiko Komatsu called it “resonant death,” and I called 
it “brain death as a form of human relationships.” I named this line of 
thought “human relationship–oriented approaches to brain death,” which 
was one of the most characteristic features of the Japanese discussions of 
brain death in this period. [32/33]  
 
4. Person and Persona 
 
Let us go back to the mid-1980s again. During this period, I was continuing 
a critical study of bioethics literature written in English while investigating 
brain death and other ethical issues of life and death in Japan. However, 
gradually I began to feel a sense of discomfort with bioethics. 
 
One reason for this was that bioethics literature in English at that time 
rarely talked about the importance of human relationships between a 
brain-dead patient and family members. After reading a number of 
Japanese works dealing with human relationships, bioethics literature in 
English that concentrated its discussion solely on the concept of human 
death, brain death criteria, and the utilization of organs looked really 
strange to my eyes. And at the basis of their discussion, there was a shared 
presupposition that brain death was nothing but human death. Of course 
there were rare exceptions, such as Hans Jonas’s argument, but almost all 
discussions took the brain-death-as-human-death theory for granted, and 
this irritated me a lot. I did not understand why a person who had lost inner 
self-consciousness ought to be “universally” considered dead as a human 
being, especially when the patient is a beloved family member. Of course it 
is true that self-consciousness and rationality play a crucial role in a human 
person, but the essence of life of a human person should not be reduced to 
mere self-consciousness and/or rationality. The life of a brain-dead patient 
sometimes “leaks out into” the space surrounded by family members or 
close friends at the bedside. I could not find this kind of discussion in 
bioethics literature in English.(3) 
 
The following is an impressive passage from Michi Nakajima’s book 
Invisible Death (1985): 
 
During a five-month period of observing brain-dead patients in an 
Intensive Care Unit, there was one thing that caused me to feel very 
awkward: nobody in the family took the brain-dead person’s hands or 
shed tears when told that the husband, wife, or beloved child was 
deceased. At first, I tried to convince myself that I happened to have 
people who were cold-minded, and very rational. But I came to 
understand that nobody, in fact, could perceive the reality of the 
beloved one’s brain death. …. 
 
However, without exception, these people start crying intensely or 
shed tears calmly when the brain-dead person’s heart stops beating 
[33/34] and the respirator is taken off. At this moment, they finally 
realize the death of their beloved one.(4) 
 
Nakajima’s book impressed a number of readers, and determined the basic 
tone of the Japanese discussion of brain death thereafter. Nakajima’s 
emphasis was placed on the question, “What is brain death when it occurs 
to our beloved ones?”, and the writers who were influenced by Nakajima 
sought to figure out the essence of the reality that family members would 
experience when sharing time with a brain-dead patient at the bedside. I 
could not find in bioethics literature in English a philosophical discussion 
of the reason why such dynamic emotional processes emerged in the family 
members’ minds. 
 
In 1995 Kunio Yanagida, a well-known journalist, published a book entitled 
Sacrifice in which he confessed his own experience with his son who 
became brain dead after committing suicide. He describes his experience as 
follows: 
 
When Ken’ichiro and I [Kunio Yanagida] talked to Yojiro, though he 
was brain-dead, his body talked back to us. This was truly a 
mysterious experience. This was probably a sense that can be 
understood only by members of a family who have shared happiness 
and sorrows with each other. Despite the scientific explanation that a 
brain-dead person is literally a dead person who has no consciousness 
or senses, I became quite sure that a beloved one’s brain-dead body 
means a lot to the family members who have shared a spiritual life 
with each other.(5) 
 
While sitting in front of his brain-dead son, Yanagida was recalling 
memories of his relationship with his son from his birth to recent days. Not 
only beautiful memories but regrettable ones flowed out into his mind, and 
one time when he talked to his brain-dead son he felt as if his son talked 
back to him without any spoken language. This was a very strange 
experience for him because he strongly felt as if there were someone, some 
living person, in front of him, although his son was in the state of brain 
death, lying on the bed without self-consciousness. As a journalist, 
Yanagida clearly understood the fact that a brain-dead patient has lost 
self-consciousness permanently, but as a father he could not help noticing a 
fragment of personhood on his beloved son’s brain-dead body. We can find 
similar narratives in memoirs of families of brain-dead patients. 
 
I have long been thinking about this “fragment of personhood” that 
sometimes appears on brain-dead bodies. In 2010, I published the paper 
“Person and Persona” and tried to understand the mysterious essence of a 
fragment of personhood by using the concept of “persona.”(6) I defined a 
[34/35] persona as follows. A persona is something that sometimes appears 
to exist on the body of a brain-dead patient, and people who have had a 
close relationship with the patient can perceive its existence. This means 
that a persona reveals itself to a limited group of people surrounding that 
patient. We should keep in mind that a persona is not self-consciousness or 
a soul lurking inside the body, but instead that it is something which 
emerges out of human relationships between a brain-dead patient and 
his/her family members or close friends. We cannot directly see, touch, or 
hear a persona itself, but we can perceive its existence with our whole body 
and we can communicate with it without language. A persona has alluring 
power to prompt us to begin communication with it. 
 
In an impressive memoir by the parents of a brain-dead daughter,(7) they 
write vividly about how their brain-dead daughter let them communicate 
with her body. For example, the father put perfume on the daughter’s foot, 
and every time he left the patient’s room, he spoke to his daughter: 
“Gambariya (Hang in there)!” In this case, they perceived a persona on 
their daughter’s body, and the vivid power of the persona prompted them to 
make such actions. 
 
The original meaning of the word “persona” is “mask.” In the beginning, 
“persona” meant something that covers a human face, not something that 
lurks inside the human body. Hence, the word “persona” seems to be well 
suited to our discussion. A persona can appear not only on the brain dead 
body, but also on the body of a living healthy person. A persona could even 
appear on the body or the face of a doll, or that of a robot. This line of 
thought will lead us to a kind of animistic worldview in which everything 
in the universe could have its own persona. In my book Philosophy of 
Connecting Life and Death, 2011, I call a philosophical analysis of life and 
death based on an animistic worldview “philosophical animism.”(8) In this 
sense, the philosophical analysis of persona might be considered an attempt 
to clarify the inner logic of animism revealed in the context of brain death 
and organ transplantation. 
 
By the way, I am not the first Japanese philosopher who focused attention 
on the concept of persona. It was Tetsuro Watsuji (1889-1960) who 
discussed this concept for the first time from a philosophical point of view. 
In his essay “Mask and Persona,” published in 1935, Watsuji makes the 
following argument.(9) In a Nô play, a Japanese traditional stage 
performance, a player sets a special mask on his face and dances on the 
stage. Watsuji says a Nô mask looks like the face of a person who has died 
suddenly. However, as soon as a Nô player puts a mask on his face, the 
mask starts to show various expressions as if it were the face of a living 
person. The movement of the Nô player’s body breathes “life” into the dead 
mask and lets it show various emotions [35/36] of a living person. Watsuji 
argues that a strange inversion occurs here. It is the player that moves his 
body; however, from the viewpoint of an audience, it is the mask that 
moves the player’s body, expressing a variety of inner emotions such as 
anger, love, regret, and guilt.  
 
In a Nô play, the main dancer plays the role of a person who, long after 
his/her regrettable death, comes back again to this world in order to convey 
his/her emotion of unfinished regret to an audience. At first the player’s 
mask is that of a deceased person, but gradually the player’s bodily 
movement begins to give life to it, and finally, in the midst of a beautiful 
dance, the mask acquires vital sparkles on its surface. Watsuji suggests that 
in a Nô play the mask or the face is considered a locus of personhood, that 
is to say, “persona.” 
 
Reading Watsuji’s essay, I thought his persona theory could explain the 
function of a persona that appears on the brain-dead body as well. In the 
case of a Nô mask, the player’s movement breathes life into a dead mask 
and lets “persona” appear on the mask. In the case of a brain-dead patient, 
the accumulation of the history of relationships between the patient and 
surrounding family members breathes life into the brain-dead patient’s 
body and lets “persona” appear on that body. The history of relationships in 
the latter corresponds to the player’s bodily movement in the former. 
Moreover, we can see a striking similarity between a Nô play and a 
brain-dead patient’s case, that is to say, both are the story of a dialogue 
between a dead/dying person and living people. In a Nô play a deceased 
person comes onto the stage and has a dialogue with other dancers who 
happen to encounter that person. And after a discussion the deceased 
person plays a final dance and walks out slowly backstage. In a case of a 
brain-dead patient, family members have a dialogue with the unspeaking 
brain-dead patient for several days, remembering various memories 
between them, and when the heart of a brain dead patient stops beating, a 
persona disappears silently from his/her body.  
 
I still have a lot of things to say about the concept of persona, but in any 
case, it has taken me more than twenty years to come up with this idea 
since the publication of my first book on brain death in 1989. I believe that 
this concept has the potential power to reconstruct some basic frameworks 
of modern philosophy to create another way of looking at the world and 
human life. It will certainly lead us to a fundamental reconsideration of the 
ego-and-alter-ego framework in modern epistemology. It has been a long 
way from bioethics to the philosophy of persona. [37/38]  
 
5. The Principle of Wholeness 
 
In July 2009, some bills to amend the Japanese organ transplantation law 
were sent to the House of Councilors (Sangiin). The majority of 
representatives were in favor of the bill prepared by Rep. Taro Kono, which 
aimed to enable organ transplants from brain-dead small children unless 
their family members refuse it. I was against that bill. I had argued that 
organ transplants from brain-dead small children ought to be prohibited 
because their bodies have a capacity to grow even in the state of brain 
death (long-term brain death). I was called to give unsworn testimony in 
the House of Councilors from the perspective of a specialist in bioethics 
who was an advocate only of careful deliberation on this matter. The night 
before the testimony, I was staying up late and thinking about how I could 
persuade representatives who were eager to increase the number of 
harvested organs from brain dead children. 
 
Suddenly, the words “natural right to grow and die in the form of 
wholeness” came to my mind. I wrote an outline of my presentation using 
that key phrase, and the next day I read it in front of the representatives. 
The following is a summary of my talk. 
 
Recently a number of “long-term brain death” cases have been reported 
worldwide. In those cases, the heartbeat of a brain-dead small child 
continues for more than several months, in some cases for more than ten 
years, and sometimes the child’s body physically grows. In 2000, an 
eleven-month-old boy became brain dead at Hyogo Medical College. The 
heart of this boy continued beating for 326 days. His brain death was 
strictly diagnosed following the Japanese criteria for brain death. During 
that period, the height of the brain-dead boy increased from 74cm to 84cm, 
and his hands and legs were constantly moving. If we are to define brain 
death as human death, this boy should be considered a “growing corpse,” 
which runs totally against our intuition. 
 
The cases of long-term brain death made me think that the organs of a 
brain-dead small child ought not to be harvested because he/she still has a 
capacity to grow, and we should protect the process of growing from 
outside invasion. I would like to explain this idea using the words “natural 
rights.” A brain-dead child has a “natural right” to grow in the form of 
wholeness and die in the form of wholeness. The child’s body ought to be 
protected in the form of wholeness from other people’s desires to utilize it. 
However, at the same time, if a child who has expressed his/her clear 
intention to be an organ donor becomes brain dead, the natural right to 
grow and die in the form of wholeness has to be overwritten by his/her 
wish. 
 
I would like to call this idea “the principle of wholeness.” This principle 
can be applied not only to small children but all people, including adults. 
[37/38] Hence, the principle of wholeness can be restated as follows: 1) All 
brain-dead persons, including adults and children, are “holy beings”; 2) if 
they have not expressed any clear wishes for organ donation, their 
brain-dead bodies should be protected from any type of outside invasion; 3) 
if they have expressed clear wishes for organ donation, their wish should be 
given priority over the holiness of their brain-dead bodies. And I would like 
to add the principle of wholeness to a list of “natural rights”: rights to life, 
freedom, and property, proposed by Hobbes and Locke, which are 
considered to be given unconditionally to everyone when we are born. The 
principle of wholeness is a newly discovered natural right in the age of 
biomedical technology. If we apply this principle to brain-dead small 
children, it necessarily follows that small children with severe heart disease 
who cannot live without heart transplants will have to die, because hearts of 
small size cannot be obtained from brain-dead adult donors. This is a huge 
problem for parents who are waiting for donated organs for their children. 
However, I believe that protecting the process of growing and dying of 
brain-dead small children is more important than harvesting organs for 
recipient children with severe diseases. A more accurate and 
comprehensive discussion on this point can be found in my paper “A 
Natural Right to Grow and Die in the Form of Wholeness.”(10) 
 
A couple of days after the testimony, a vote was held in the House of 
Councilors, and a new law based on the bill by Rep. Taro Kono was 
established. My speech did not have enough political power to reverse the 
representatives’ opinions. I was again forced to face the reality that I am in 
a minority position regarding this topic even in a country where many 
ordinary people are said to have hesitation toward the idea of brain death.  
Experiencing this “defeat,” I determined to deal with this issue mainly from 
a philosophical point of view rather than from a political point of view. 
Looking at this issue from the viewpoint of philosophy, we can find a 
variety of interesting ideas and insights in the discourse and discussions of 
brain death and organ transplantation in Japan over the past 30 years.  
 
6. Life Studies and Philosophy of Life 
 
I would like to end this essay by making a brief comment on the ideas of 
“life studies” and “philosophy of life.” As my study of bioethics progressed 
in my early years of research, I gradually began to feel frustration with the 
method and content of that discipline. Firstly, it lacked a broad perspective 
that could cover ethical issues concerning the relationship between humans 
and the global environment. Secondly, I could not figure out what kind of 
contribution [38/39] it could make to our questions about the meaning of 
life. And thirdly, most bioethical discussions, such as those of abortion and 
brain death, seemed to have been done from a distance, that is to say, it 
seemed to me that researchers “shelved” themselves when discussing the 
issues. My intuition was that researchers themselves ought to come closer 
to the issues; for example, when discussing abortion, researchers should 
suppose the case in which they themselves became unwillingly pregnant or 
their partner became unwillingly pregnant, and think deeply about what it 
would mean to themselves on the level of philosophy, ethics, and 
spirituality. To my eyes, this kind of approach was rare in academic 
bioethics at that time. 
 
In my first book, An Invitation to the Study of Life, published in 1988, I 
coined the term “life studies” for a new research method that was to 
overcome such limitations of bioethics.(11) Since then I have been using 
these words to describe the characteristics of my works on life, death, 
sexuality, contemporary civilization, and Japanese culture. For me life 
studies means a way of studying the subjects of life and death by never 
dissociating myself from the issue in question. And it is also an attempt to 
acquire the intellectual capacity, wisdom, and systematically organized 
knowledge that are needed to live our limited lives without regret. 
 
Recently, I have begun to think that in addition to a life studies approach, a 
new discipline, “philosophy of life,” should be established in the field of 
contemporary philosophy. For example, bioethicists talk much about life 
extension and enhancement technologies; however, in order to fully discuss 
these issues we have to think deeply about such questions as “What does 
longer life mean to humans?” and “Do enhanced abilities provide us with 
true happiness and fulfillment?” I believe these questions will be best 
pursued in the field of philosophy of life rather than bioethics. 
 
Surprisingly, we have not had “philosophy of life” as an academic 
discipline. Of course, there was Lebensphilosophie, or philosophie de la 
vie; however, these terms only mean German and French philosophers of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A broader perspective is needed that 
can cover philosophical thought from ancient times to the present, in the 
East and the West. I believe it is time to learn from the abundant 
accumulation of the work of past thinkers about their thoughts on life, 
death, and nature; by using these as helpful reference materials, we can 
straightforwardly tackle contemporary issues in bioethics from a variety of 
angles. It is worth noticing that such attempts have partly begun in 
English-language bioethics in such books as Beyond Therapy (2003) and 
Human Dignity and Bioethics (2008), both of which were published by the 
US President’s Council on Bioethics.(12) I wish to enlarge on their 
attempts to create a new field in contemporary philosophy. In 2011, my 
colleagues and I established an [39/40] academic open access web-based 
journal entitled Journal of Philosophy of Life (www.philosophyoflife.org).  
 
In contrast to the philosophy of life, which is to be developed as an 
academic discipline, life studies has the potential to flourish outside the 
academy, because the essence of life studies lies in the commitment never 
to dissociate oneself from his/her research topics, and if one honestly 
follows this method one will have to step outside of an academic discipline. 
In 2009, the first annual conference of the Japanese Association for 
Contemporary and Applied Philosophy was held at Kyoto University. 
“Applied philosophy” is a newly established philosophical discipline. In a 
keynote lecture I gave a presentation about how I encountered bioethics 
and have since tried to overcome its limitations. When preparing slides for 
my talk, I realized that my attempt to go beyond bioethics in the name of 
“life studies” was also an effort to create a new way of exploring “applied 
philosophy” — in other words, an attempt to make an applied philosophy 
that is to be applied to “one’s own actual life.” This suggests that applied 
philosophy, just like life studies, might flourish outside the academy in the 
future. 
 
This is how I encountered bioethics, and how I parted from it in order to 
establish a new research field that can contribute to the comprehensive 
understanding of the meaning of life and death in the age of biotechnology. 
 
  
Notes: 
1) Morioka (1989), p.9. 
2) Jankélévitch (1966). 
3) Later I found relationship-oriented discussions in feminist bioethics. I 
am not sure if they have applied its perspective to brain death and organ 
transplantation. 
4) Michi Nakajima (1985), pp.12-13. 
5) Yanagida (1995), p.129. 
6) Morioka (2010). 
7) Fujiwara (1993), p.23. 
8) Morioka (2012). 
9) Watsuji (1935). 
10) Morioka (2012). 
11) Morioka (1988). 
12) President’s Council on Bioethics (2003), (2008). 
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